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Abstract
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The causes and consequences of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in developing countries remains a subject of debate 
among researchers and policymakers alike. The authors 
use international data and a new micro-data set of firms 
in thirteen Southern African Developing Countries 
(SADCs) to investigate the benefits and determinants 
of FDI in this region. FDI appears to have facilitated 
local development in the SADC region. Foreign firms 
tend to perform better than domestic firms, tend to be 
larger, are located in richer and better-governed countries 
and in countries with more competitive financial 
intermediaries, and they are more likely to export than 
domestic firms. They also exhibit positive spillover 
effects to domestic firms. Relying on a standard model 
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to predict the country-level FDI inflows per capita, the 
authors find that SADC is attracting their expected 
level of FDI inflows, at least relative to its income level, 
human capital, demographic structure, institutions, 
and economic track record. There are some differences 
between SADC and the rest of the world in FDI 
behavior: in SADC, the income level is less important 
and openness more so. The authors use two comparison 
groups to compare with SADC to shed light on why 
other regions have attracted more FDI per capita than 
SADC. The factors that explain SADC’s low FDI inflows 
are economic fundamentals (e.g., previous growth rates, 
average income, phone density, and the adult share of 
population).   1
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1. Introduction   
Foreign direct investment (FDI) can reduce income gaps between developing and 
advanced economies. In the neoclassical world with perfect capital mobility and 
technology transfer, capital readily flows from rich to poor countries, seeking higher 
returns in capital-scarce economies. We do not see this in the data. Even though the 
southern African countries (the South African Development Community, SADC hereafter) 
are poor on average, per capital FDI inflows for the SADC region are only 36.6 U.S. 
dollars (in 2000 value), which is about 18 percent of the average level for the non-SADC 
sample (202.8 dollars), and 58 percent of the average level for the similar-income sample 
(63.2 dollars). Moreover, within the SADC region, country differences are huge:  FDI per 
capita (in 2000 U.S. value) ranges from single digits (Malawi, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and Tanzania) to 10 to 30 dollars (Mozambique, Zambia, 
Mauritius, and Swaziland), to 50 to 100 dollars (Lesotho, South Africa, and Angola), and 
to 167 dollars in the outlier in this region, the middle-income Botswana.  Even within this 
region we detect a positive relationship between average income and FDI per capita.  
This pattern holds in the world sample as well.  Thus, the hope of relying on FDI inflows 
as a “supply side remedy” to catapult poor countries into the fast track of development, as 
prescribed by the United Nations (1999), is not likely to materialize soon. 
  Perhaps with these low FDI numbers in mind, policy makers and development 
agencies are concerned about FDI performance in SADCs.
2 One hopes that FDI can play 
a positive role in local economic development, but this is not obvious. It is possible that 
foreign entrants merely capture rents, that the new jobs created may merely crowd out 
domestic jobs, and that there is no technological spillover, but rather “market stealing”, 
effects on domestic firms.  In addition, it is possible that the benefits of FDI differ across 
economic contexts.  For example, the benefits may depend on market size and the time-
horizon of foreign capital, which itself is shaped by the institutional environment.  This 
combination of high hopes and unclear evidence puts empirical research in center stage. 
Thus, it is useful to investigate empirically whether FDI plays a positive role in SADC, 
                                                 
2 An ongoing World Bank report on SADC regional integration also emphasizes the role of FDI on SADC 
development.   3
and if so, in what ways.   Many also presume that the FDI inflow levels to the region are 
too low.  How much is too little? What factors can explain the observed FDI inflows?   
The current literature does not answer these questions, partly due to the lack of 
reliable and comparable micro data. New data is now available. The World Bank’s 
investment climate surveys in this region offer comparable cross-country, firm-level data 
with information that allows us to link foreign ownership to firm performance and 
behavior in thirteen SADC economies.
 3  
The evidence suggests that FDI has significantly facilitated development in the 
SADC region.  Foreign firms tend to perform better, as measured by both sales growth 
rates and total factor productivity.  They tend to be larger, located in richer and better-
governed countries with more competitive financial intermediaries.  They are also more 
likely to export than domestic firms. Moreover, domestic firms in the same broad 
industry tend to benefit from the presence of foreign firms.  Since we found positive 
effects of foreign ownership on local economies, we also examined what determines FDI 
inflows to this region? To answer this question, we rely on an accepted empirical model 
to predict the level of FDI inflows per capita (Fan et al. 2009):  FDI per capita is a 
function of market size, infrastructure, education, exchange rates, economic track records 
(mean growth in the previous 5 years, and the variability of growth in the same period), 
and institutions.  In addition, we look for SADC-specific effects. However, we find that 
the SADC coefficient is insignificant, which implies that SADC performs as expected, 
given its average income, human capital, demographic structure, institutions, and 
economic track record.
4  It seems, therefore, that the usual suspects explain SADC’s FDI 
performance. We did find some significant differences between SADC and the rest of the 
world in FDI behavior: in SADC, market size as proxied by the income level is less 
important and openness more so.   
                                                 
3 The fact that we only have comprehensive investment climate survey for SADC explains why we pick 
SADC rather than the Sub-Saharan region as the focus region for our study. 
4 Our conclusion may seem to differ from Asiedu (2002), which examines whether Africa differs from 
other regions in FDI behavior.  Their answer is yes.  However, there is no contradiction here: they focus on 
Sub-Saharan Africa, while we focus on the southern African countries (SADC), which attracts relatively 
more FDI than the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa (Basu and Srinivasan, 2002).  Moreover, Asiedu (2002) does 
not control for country economic performance. So part of the differences may be due to difference in 
specification.     4
To shed light on the potential drivers of FDI for this region, we compare SADC 
with two groups of developing countries with higher FDI per capita.  The factors that 
account for SADC’s lower FDI inflows are economic fundamentals: previous growth 
rates, income, phone density, and the adult share of the population. Interestingly, while 
income and infrastructure do not matter as much in SADC as in the rest of the world, 
openness matters more.  This is consistent with the view that FDI to small countries is 
more export-oriented. 
The next section discusses firm-level evidence about how foreign ownership 
affects firm behavior and performance. Section three relies on country-level panel data to 
understand what determines FDI inflows, and what explains the FDI performance of the 
SADC region.  Section four concludes.   
 
2.  Micro Consequences of Foreign Ownership in SADC   
  If foreign investment supports development, its effects should show up in firm 
performance or some indicators of "good outcomes", such as export orientation and 
spillover effects on domestic firms.  
  A priori it is unclear whether the advent of foreign-owned firms improves firm 
performance in SADC.  SADC might feature differences in the nature of FDI as well as 
in the complementary factors (such as business environments) for FDI to work its magic.  
As the domestic markets in SADC tend to be too small (except for a few countries such 
as South Africa) for R&D investment to make economic sense, technological spillover 
from R&D of foreign companies (conducted in headquarter countries of multinational 
companies) may improve local productivity.  Moreover, capital shortages or financial 
constraints may limit firm size, making foreign firms more productive.    
  To investigate this issue and to provide a rationale for whether FDI has led to real 
economic benefits to local economies, we investigate how foreign ownership is related to 
firm performance, as measured by sales growth and total factor productivity, which   
capture dynamic and static firm performance, respectively. Productivity should capture   5
what developing countries look for from FDI: scale economies, better technology and 
managerial know-how.  The empirical literature has not reached a consensus about the 
benefits of foreign ownership on productivity (Caves, 1999). Some found no differences 
in productivity (for instance, Konings, 2001). Others found some raw differences, which 
largely disappear when better measurements were provided for input quality.  Still others 
found significant foreign ownership premium in productivity (Yasar and Paul, 2007; 
Hallward-Driemeier, Wallsten and Xu, 2006; Xu, Zhu and Lin, 2005; Zhang, Zhang and 
Zhao, 2001).  
The Data Set 
Our data sets, the investment climate surveys conducted by the World Bank over the past 
decade, take a snapshot of a country's business environment, including access to finance, 
physical and regulatory infrastructure, corruption, and the necessary accounting 
information to estimate productivity.  The SADC sample that we use consists of the 
following countries: Angola (two waves), Botswana (two waves), Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia (two waves), 
South Africa, Swaziland (two waves), Tanzania (two waves), and Zambia.  For each 
wave, the number of firms range from 75 (Lesotho) to 1057 (South Africa). The firms 
were randomly sampled from the universe of firms for each country.  The surveys have 
been conducted over the past five years.  The sample periods differ by countries, but all 
are between 2005 and 2009. The data set is cross-sectional in nature.
5 
  Table 1 reports the definitions of the variables used in the firm-level regressions, 
including some of the variables measured at the country level. Table 2 shows the 
differences in sample characteristics for foreign and domestic firms in the SADC region.  
Foreign firms are defined to be those with positive foreign ownership.
6  Foreign firms 
tend to be significantly larger--the median foreign firm in SADC is 70 log points (or 100 
percent) larger than domestic ones.  The countries they are located in tend to be richer by 
almost 28 log points.  Surprisingly, host countries tend to have higher firing costs.  A 
possible explanation is that, in response to opening up for foreign ownership, countries 
                                                 
5 When there are two waves for a country, the data are repeated cross sections.    
6 Other thresholds for defining foreign ownership produced qualitatively similar results.   6
impose higher firing costs to respond to populist demands.  Unsurprisingly, foreign firms 
tend to be located in countries with more competitive banks, which are characterized by 
lower interest spreads (i.e., the discrepancy between lending and borrowing rates at 
banks).  Similarly, foreign firms tend to be located in countries exhibiting higher indices 
of government efficiency (by ICRG).  Foreign firms tend to suffer lower losses of sales 
due to crimes. 
  Our measure of productivity, total factor productivity (TFP), is estimated based 
on an industry-specific Cobb-Douglas production function for the pooled sample of 
countries.  As a sensitivity check, we also estimate translog TFP (TFPtran hereafter), 
which is otherwise the same as the above except that we allow for a quadratic production 
function, which is more general than the Cobb-Douglas specification.   
  Foreign firms in the SADC region perform better than domestic firms.  The 
median TFP (TFPtran) for foreign firms is higher by 11 (5) log points.  Thus, there is 
some, but a limited, amount of productivity advantage.  In terms of sales growth,
7 the 
median is slightly lower (7.8 versus 9.3 percent), though foreign firms have a 
significantly higher mean, suggesting that there are a small share of foreign firms having 
very high growth rates. Finally, the share of foreign firms that export is much greater than 
that of domestic firms (21 versus 8 percent). 
Results on firm performance and foreign ownership  
While foreign ownership is clearly associated with better firm performance, it is unclear 
whether this is due to other variables correlated with foreign ownership. We estimate the 
following models to test the robustness of the descriptive results: 
  ic c ic ic ic e Z F FRN Y                (1) 
where i refers to a firm, and c refers to a country.  Y is either TFP or the sales growth rate.  
FRN is foreign ownership.  Firm level controls, F, include the share of ownership by the 
largest shareholder, the age of the firm (in logarithm), and the share of losses of sales due 
                                                 
7 Three years of sales are reported in the data.   7
to crime.
8  The country level controls, Z, include logged GDP per capita, the ICRG index 
of government efficiency, the firing costs in years of salary, and the interest spread (as a 
measure of banking competitiveness).  All the country-level variables come from the 
World Development Indicators data base of the World Bank.  Since the regressions are at 
the firm level, while we have country-level explanatory variables, to avoid exaggerating 
estimation precision, we cluster the standard errors at the country level (Moulton 1986).  
Table 3 reports the results.   
  The most important finding is that foreign ownership has a strong and significant 
relationship with both sales growth and TFP.  Increasing foreign ownership by 10 
percentage points would increase sales growth by 1.2 percentage points, and TFP by 1.8 
percentage points—effects that are non-trivial.  To put this in perspective, Table A1 in 
the appendix provides the comparison of SADC with the East Asia and Pacific region 
(consisting of China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, EAP hereafter) and all non-
SADC countries with similar income level as SADCs.
9    Foreign ownership is 
significantly higher in SADC (17.5 percent) than in EAP (13.5 percent) and the similar-
income sample (10.8 percent).  In light of the positive effect of foreign ownership and 
SADC's advantage in this measure, foreign ownership has reduced the disadvantage of 
SADC toward other regions. 
  The other findings on performance determinants are also illuminating.  The 
intensity of crime (as measured by the share of sales lost due to crimes) is positively 
associated with sales growth but negatively with TFP.  Firms in countries with higher 
income levels tend to have higher TFP--a country that is richer by 100 percent tends to 
have a productivity premium of 7 percent, which could reflect the forces of better 
institutions and a large market. Unsurprisingly, a higher firing cost and, thus, a higher 
exit barrier, is associated with lower productivity level.  An interpretation is that higher 
firing costs cause shirking of workers and, therefore, lower efficiency for a fixed amount 
of capital and labor. This is consistent with what is commonly found in many developing 
                                                 
8 We have also tried specifications including the share of losses of sales due to power outage and the 
average level of schooling of firm employees.  The results including these additional controls are similar.  
However, several countries do not have these measures. To preserve as many SADC countries as possible 
in our sample, we opted to report the results without including them. 
9 That is, with income less than 4600 U.S. dollars of 2000, the level of South Africa.   8
countries (Xu forthcoming).  Another finding is that both sales growth and TFP is 
negatively affected by higher bank interest spread.  Our interpretation is that when banks 
are less competitive--with a higher interest spread--firms cannot expand as much because 
capital costs are too high or because it is more difficult to find alternative sources of 
finance, hence, the lower the sales growth rate. Similarly, a higher interest spread leads to 
a more distorted capital-labor ratio and, therefore, a lower productivity level.   
Interestingly, countries with higher government efficiency levels are associated with a 
higher sales growth rate but lower productivity level.  Finally, larger firms tend to grow 
faster in SADC.    
Foreign ownership and exporting status   
Exporting may be particularly important for SADC and other African economies that  
tend to be small.  Exports also signal stronger competitiveness in the region.  Thus, one 
way to gauge the benefits of foreign ownership is to examine whether it also helps firms 
to export.  In general, one expects foreign ownership to facilitate exports because foreign 
firms tend to have better technologies, management know-how, besides possessing better 
information of exporting opportunities.  On the other hand, foreign owners could enter 
the local market just for quick profits in the domestic market.  They may also set up 
operations in the hosting countries to avoid excessive import tariffs imposed by hosting 
countries.  To investigate this issue, we thus report the following linear probability model: 
  ic c ic ic ic Z F Frn Export          
where  Export  is a dummy variable indicating an exporting firm. Subscripts i  and  c 
indicate firm and country.  Frn is foreign ownership, F is firm characteristics, and Z is 
country characteristics.  We also experimented with probit and logit specifications, and 
the results are very similar.  For ease in interpretation of magnitudes, we have opted to 
report the linear probability model.
10  Again, standard errors are clustered at the country 
level.  The results are in Table 4. 
                                                 
10 Further controlling for employee schooling and the share of losses due to power shortages does not 
change our results but reduce our sample significantly.   9
  Relative to a domestic firm, the probability of exporting for a foreign firm is 
higher by almost 6 percentage points.  This effect is quite large since the average 
probability of exporting for domestic firms is only 6.3 percent.   Only a few other 
determinants of exporting status have statistically significant coefficients.  Large firms, 
not surprisingly, tend to export.  Interestingly, firms featuring a higher share of ownership 
by the largest owner (e.g., a proxy of family ownership) are less likely to export. 
Are there Spillover Effects of FDI?   
An important benefit from FDI is believed to be the spillover effects of FDI on domestic 
firms in terms of transfers in technologies, managerial know-hows, and competition 
effects.  The spillover effects can be either horizontal or vertical.  Horizontal spillovers 
refer to effects of the presence of foreign-owned firms on domestic firms within the same 
industry (or specializing in the same product).  There are two counteracting effects 
related to horizontal spillovers: (a) the positive aspects such as technological spillovers, 
personnel movements, transfer of managerial know-how, and the cultivation of more 
efficient local input suppliers; (b) the negative aspects associated with foreign firms being 
competitors of domestic firms, taking away market shares, increasing the average fixed 
costs and, therefore, reducing productivity of domestic firms. The positive horizontal 
effects are also tempered by the fact that foreign firms have strong incentives to reduce 
the spillover of productive secrets to domestic firms via intellectual property rights and 
paying for efficiency wages to reduce personnel departures.  Thus, the horizontal 
spillover effects tend to be ambiguous.  Indeed, many recent studies find insignificant and 
even negative horizontal spillover effects—sometimes dubbed the “market-stealing” 
effect. The reference along this line includes Haddad and Harrison (1993) on Morocco, 
Aitken and Harrison (1999) on Venezuela, Djankov and Hoekman (2000) on the Czech 
Republic, and Konings (2001) on Bulgaria, Romania and Poland.  The evidence appears 
to be more positive for the horizontal effects of FDI in developed countries (Haskel et al. 
2002; Keller and Yeaple 2003) based on evidence from the United Kingdom and the 
United States.  In contrast, Kee (2010) finds positive horizontal FDI spillover effects due 
to the cultivating of and the stronger demand for local input suppliers based on a sample 
of Bangladeshi garment firms.  Vertical spillover effects refer to the potential benefits for   10
input suppliers or clients of foreign companies, such as by offering technological help, 
stronger quality control, and so on.  Since there are no conflicts of interests between 
foreign firms and their clients and suppliers in technology and managerial know-how 
spillovers, vertical spillover effects are more likely.  This is indeed what is found in 
Javorcik (2004) for Lithuania. Thus, it is safe to say that the evidence has been at most 
mixed.  In surveying related evidence, Rodrik (1999) stated that “today’s policy literature 
is filled with extravagant claims about positive spillover effects from FDI but the 
evidence is sobering.”  The understanding of the spillover effects is further complicated 
by the idea that the effects of policies tend to differ across contexts due to differences in 
complementary institutions, regulatory environments, and even skill levels of local 
employees (Kremer 1993; Hausman, Rodrik and Velasco 2005; Xu forthcoming).   
  The data only allow us to identify the spillover effects within broad industry 
categories.  We first compute country-industry-level average foreign ownership, 
weighted by the share of employment in the industry (FRNc, j).  We then estimate the 
productivity model with the sample of domestic firms only but adding FRNc, j as an 
additional regressor.  A positive coefficient indicates positive spillovers.
11 Note that we 
do not interpret the results as pure horizontal spillovers.  The industry category in our 
data is at the two-digit level.  The spillovers effect is thus a mixture of both horizontal 
and vertical spillovers effects—besides the typical horizontal spillovers effect, our broad 
externality measure also captures the vertical spillovers effect of, say, foreign-owned 
firms specializing in electronic components on downstream domestic firms specializing 
on other electronic products.   
The results are in Table 5. The results show a robust and positive spillover effect 
from foreign-owned firms.  FRNc, j has a positive and significant coefficient of around 
0.22, regardless of the TFP indicator.  The magnitude is nontrivial: increasing average 
foreign ownership by 10 percentage points would increase domestic firms’ productivity 
in the same industry by 2 percentage points.  Thus, besides the direct effect of raising 
                                                 
11 We drop firms in industries with fewer than five domestic firms in order to avoid inference based on too 
few firms in an industry (of a country).   11
average productivity, foreign-owned firms also seem to enhance the productivity of 
domestic firms within broad industries. 
 
3.   SADC's FDI inflows per capita in international perspective  
  Foreign ownership seems to play a significantly positive role in SADC.  In this 
section we examine the relative performance of SADC countries in attracting FDI, as 
measured by FDI inflow per capita.  In particular, what are the key determinants of FDI 
inflow?  What may explain the differences between SADC countries and comparison 
groups (such as other countries with similar income levels)?  We proceed in several steps.  
First, we lay out a simple theoretical framework for the key determinants of FDI across 
countries.  Second, we explain our empirical framework and key variables.  Finally, we 
present the results from cross-country regressions on FDI.   
A Simple Theoretical Framework 
The literature on FDI points us towards a relatively simple generic empirical specification 
(Fan et al., 2009).  The modern FDI literature views prospective multinational firms as 
possessing information-based firm-specific capabilities that they could profitably apply in 
foreign countries.  Indeed, these capabilities allow them to overcome the “difficulties of 
being foreign” to generate returns to justify the investment (Morck and Yeung 1991, 
1992).  Agency problems, information asymmetries, and property rights protection 
problems that render information-based assets inalienable prevent these firms from 
selling or leasing those capabilities to foreign firms.  To profitably apply their unique 
capabilities abroad, multinationals resort to establishing controlled foreign operations to 
engage in FDI.  Still, FDI is an investment like any other in the sense that it aims to 
capture positive net present values.  
  The net present value of a corporate investment project depends on a number of 
factors.  The first is the size of an economy (Caves 1999).  With a larger economy, 
investment projects with high fixed cost components yield higher net present values.  All 
else equal, FDI inflow into larger economies should be higher.  The net present value a   12
firm sees also depends on local product and factor market development and growth 
potential.  It depends negatively on market risks and the costs of doing business.  The last 
is perhaps more important, and contributing factors include high taxes, high wages 
relative to productivity, and generally poor infrastructure.
12 
All these factors hinge on an economy’s institutional environment. If locals make 
transparent and predictable use of norms, or established legal and political institutions, to 
adjudicate disputes, the liability of being foreign diminishes and FDI flows in.  This 
consideration echoes the finance and growth literature which emphasizes that sound and 
well-enforced rules and regulations, like property rights protection and information 
disclosure, encourage economic development in general and capital market development 
in particular (La Porta et al. 1997 and 1998; King and Levine 1993).  The reason is that 
these rules and regulations constrain opportunistic behavior and build transactional trust 
between parties (North 1991). Indeed, governments that are less corrupt, have more 
efficient bureaucracies and that impose less burdensome regulations foster economic 
development (La Porta et al. 1998), attract more FDI (Alfaro et al. 2005, Globerman and 
Shapiro 2002). 
In summary, FDI is attracted by basic economic and institutional factors.  The 
economic factors include the size of the market, the current level of development, and 
measures like education and infrastructure development that affect productivity and 
expected future development.  Obviously, other considerations like trade openness and 
the host country’s currency (see, e.g., Froot and Stein 1991) also may affect FDI.  The 
institutional factors include general measures of “good government” such as the 
establishment of law and order as well as high quality government bureaucracy.  
The empirical relationship   
                                                 
12 Coughlin, Terza, and Arromdee (1991) provide empirical support for these factors influencing inward 
FDI, though they do not consider financial development.  Froot and Stein (1991), while showing that 
undervalued host country currencies attract inward FDI, also stress the barriers firms confront in raising 
capital to finance any new investment projects.  These barriers are particularly daunting for domestic firms 
in economies with underdeveloped capital markets.  In such countries, foreign firms could have an 
advantage in capturing the NPVs of new investment projects because of their access to better functioning 
foreign capital markets (Foley, Mahir, and Hines, 2004).     13
Our dependent variable is logged per capita FDI inflows in constant US dollars of 2000, 
winsorized at the tail 5 percent.
13  We add a constant to this quantity because some 
countries have negative FDI inflows (negative FDI inflow represents repatriation of 
previous investment). Dropping the negative FDI inflow observations leads to 
qualitatively similar results.  However, we are not aware of significant economic reasons 
to exclude the observations.  
  Our objectives are twofold.  First, we wish to empirically investigate the key 
variables attracting FDI.  Second, we wish to see if FDI flowing into SADC behaves 
similarly to that flowing into other countries.  To these ends, we follow the discussion in 
the previous section and regress each country’s FDI inflows on a set of country 
characteristics associated with the quality of government, along with some basic 
measures of the level of development and other country characteristics such as population 
size, demographic characteristics and trade policies.  We include SADC in these 
regressions and then ask whether SADC’s FDI inflows behave differently from those in 
other countries.   
  We proxy general institutional quality by a commonly-used measure of the more 
general quality of government: the rule of law index from ICRG.  Rule of law is an ICRG 
survey result gauging the state of law and order in each country.  It ranges from 1 to 6, 
with higher values connoting greater general respect for the rule of law.
14  It contains a 
law component, which captures the strength and impartiality of the legal and political 
establishment in judicial matters, and an order component, which captures the extent to 
which residents of a country accept established legal and political institutions as the 
solely legitimate way to make and implement laws and to adjudicate disputes.    
  We also adopt ICRG corruption index as our control of corruption index. This  
indicator is most commonly used in the related economics literature.  This variable is 
                                                 
13 The winsorization is done to prevent the influence of outliers and measurement errors.  This variable is 
highly skewed.  The qualitative results are similar when we winsorize at the 1 or 5 percent levels.  However, 
giving the winsorization threshold is around 0 at 5 percent level, the interpretation of magnitude is a lot 
easier--log(FDI per capita + constant) is close to log(FDI per capita) when the constant is 1.4 instead of 
around 92, and log point is close to percentage point in interpretation.   
14 ICRG data has the advantage of covering the majority of countries from 1982 on. For details, see Knack 
and Rahman (2007).   14
meant to capture the likelihood that government officials will demand special payments, 
and the extent to which illegal payments are expected throughout low levels of 
government.  In addition to being consistent with previous studies, the variable has the 
advantage of having the broadest coverage of countries, which maximizes our sample 
size.  The index itself takes on values ranging from zero (most corrupt) to six (least 
corrupt).  
  Government track record.  The government track record plays an interesting role.  
FDI is large if foreign corporate investors regard a location’s investment opportunities 
highly.  Obviously, investment opportunities are more abundant in locations with better 
institutions, where government officials are not corrupt, bureaucracies are efficient, and 
the rule of law is generally upheld.  At the same time, positive shocks on investment 
opportunities often entice governments seeking to attract foreign capital to provide these 
institutions.  Hence, a simple relationship between measures of government quality and 
foreign direct investment could be misleading.  At the very least, to sort this out, our 
empirical investigation should incorporate a proxy for the presence of profitable 
investment opportunities.  That incidentally is the track record of the government in terms 
of fostering investment opportunities. These are:   
  Growth trend  is a country’s  per capita GDP growth rate  averaged over the 
previous five years.  We interpret a high past growth rate as both indicative of profitable 
investment opportunities and a track record of the country’s government fostering, or at 
least not impeding, their exploitation. 
  Macro volatility is the standard deviation of per capita GDP growth over the prior 
five years.  More unstable economic growth, all else equal, is likely less conducive to 
FDI, and less indicative of sound and predictable government policies. 
  General development is measured by the following variables: the log of per 
capita GDP in 2000 constant US dollars at PPP; education, measured by the log of the 
average years of schooling completed by the country’s adult population; infrastructure   15
quality, represented by telephones per 1000 residents; and the level of urbanization,
15 
which is the share of urban in total population. These are a set of variables commonly 
used in the literature (see Coughlin et al. 1991).   
  Following the discussion in the previous section, we incorporate a set of country 
characteristics.  We include country size, measured as the log of total population, to 
control for scale. We include the availability of adult labor force, as measured by the 
adult share of the population,
16   because productivity and growth are positively 
associated with the proportion of working age adults (Mason 2007).   
  We include each country’s currency exchange rate relative to the US dollar, all 
normalized by the rate in 2000.  This means that a higher value of exchange rate implies 
a more depreciated local currency.  Countries with undervalued currencies, all else equal, 
attract more FDI (e.g., see, Froot and Stein, 1991).     
  We also include a measure of openness (i.e., imports plus exports divided by 
GDP) for two reasons.  More trade openness reduces the need for trade-barrier jumping 
FDI.  At the same time, countries more open may attract more FDI.  For example, trade 
openness may attract vertically-related FDI and may reduce information asymmetry for 
foreign investors.  The variable is lagged by one period to avoid contemporaneous 
endogeneity bias.    
  The SADC dummy. To address whether FDI inflows to SADC are “exceptional” 
compared to other countries with similar income levels, we include a SADC dummy 
variable in the regression.   
  The specification of our empirical analysis is therefore the following: 
  it it it it SADC it INST TRACK X SADC FDIPC Ln             ' ) ( 0    (1) 
                                                 
15 We have also tried including the percent of GDP accounted by manufacturing and services, and found 
that they don't matter for attracting FDI after controlling for GDP per capita, urbanization, and other 
controls. 
16 Adults are defined to be between the age of 15 and 64.   16
where X represents variables related to general development and other characteristics, 
including log GDP per capita, log(mean years of schooling), telephone density, the urban 
share of population, the adult share of population, log population, exchange rate, and 
openness; TRACK includes the growth trend and its volatility in the past five years; INST 
are the institutional measures represented by  Rule of Law or control of corruption.
17  
Since many of the explanatory variables, especially the institutional variables, tend to be 
stable over time, using fixed effects would exacerbate the influence of measurement 
problems (Griliches and Hausman, 1986), we rely on ordinary least square method to 
estimate our regressions.  Because the errors are likely to be correlated within a country, 
we allow clustering of the error term at the country level (Moulton, 1986).   
Summary Statistics 
Table 6 reports the differences in key variables between the SADC region and the two 
comparison groups for the 2001 to 2006 period, namely, the non-SADC countries and the 
non-SADC countries with similar income levels.  The latter group drops those country-
year observations whose incomes exceeds the highest income level for the countries 
within the SADC region.  The SADC region has an average growth rate in real GDP per 
capita of 2.3 percent, lower than the non-SADC group (3.1 percent) and the similar-
income sample (3.1 percent) by 0.8 percentage points.  The average GDP per capita is 
around 1300 U.S. dollars, slightly higher than the similar-income sample, and much 
lower than the non-SADC sample.  Per capital FDI is 36.6 U.S. dollars (in 2000 value), 
about 18 percent of the average for the non-SADC sample (202.8 dollars), and 58 percent 
of the similar-income sample (63.2 dollars).  The two proxies of institutions, the rule of 
law index and the control of corruption index, are similar between SADC and the similar-
income sample, but slightly lower than the non-SADC sample.  Thus, it appears that 
SADC lags slightly behind in attracting FDI inflows relative to similar-income countries, 
and much behind when compared with the non-SADC sample.  Moreover, it seems that 
                                                 
17 There are some missing observations for the rule of law, corruption, and schooling. Since dropping all 
missing observations for these variables would entail a significant loss of sample, we impute these 
variables with basic country indicators such as GDP per capita and the urbanization share; we then also 
include missing indicators for the three vairables to capture potential mis-imputation.  We reach similar 
conclusions about our key results if we drop the sample containing the missing observations for the three 
variables.     17
the institutional disadvantage is negligible; key disadvantages for SADC seem to be its 
lower growth rate and its lower income level to the extent that these factors are important. 
Results 
Table 7 reports the results.  The pooled-sample results appear in the first three columns, 
and the similar-income sample results are reported in the next two columns. The 
institutional variable is the rule of law in Column (1), and the control-of-corruption index 
in Column (2).  Column (3) adds "trade/GDP lagged" as an additional control to test the 
robustness of our results.  The structure of the last two columns with the similar-income 
subsample is similar--except that we do not report the results using the control-of-
corruption index as an alternative institutional measure.
18 
  The alternative measures of institutions yield similar results (see columns (2) and 
(3)).  In addition, adding lagged trade/GDP does not change our main results.  However, 
since trade/GDP can be affected by FDI, it is potentially endogenous.  Thus, we leave it 
out of our base specification.  But for readers who are concerned that a major omitted 
variable might be openness, our main results are unaffected by its inclusion. Finally, the 
main results from the similar-income sample are also similar to those of the pooled 
sample.   
  We thus focus on Column (1).  Good governments with good economic track 
records attract FDI. The average growth in the previous five years appears with a positive 
and significant coefficient while growth volatility has the opposite sign (though 
statistically insignificant).  The general government quality, the rule of law variable, does 
not directly affect FDI.  Growth expectations, therefore, are the most important 
determinant of FDI amongst the government quality variables. 
  Measures of economic fundamentals matter a great deal.  Schooling, though 
statistically insignificant, has the expected sign.  Phone density is significant, indicating 
that FDI tends to flow to countries with better infrastructure.  Similarly, FDI tends to 
flow to richer countries, due perhaps to better protection of property rights, market sizes 
                                                 
18 The results are very similar and are available upon request.   18
and so on.  Another important variable is the share of adult labor force in total population, 
which has the expected positive sign and is highly significant.  This is potentially 
worrisome for SADC because the region has a higher share of dependents than other 
regions.  Interestingly, countries with a smaller population tend to have higher FDI per 
capita—perhaps the benefits of FDI (such as through bringing export opportunities) are 
higher for smaller countries, which face a tighter constraint of small domestic markets.  
  The SADC dummy is not statistically significant.  This means that once we 
control for the observed variables, the region on average does not lag behind other 
countries in attracting FDI per capita.  Thus, to look for signs why SADC is lower in FDI 
per capita, we need to focus on the explanatory variables.  
  A more general test for SADC difference is to allow SADC to interact with our 
key explanatory variables.  In our exploratory estimations we allow the coefficients of 
our main variables to be different for SADC than for the rest of the sample. It turns out 
that only the interaction terms with phone density, income level, and openness are close 
to being statistically significant.  Thus, we report a specification in Table 8 in which the 
SADC dummy variable is interacted with these three variables. The coefficients of the 
non-interacting variables remain largely the same.  The SADC dummy variable still is 
statistically insignificant.  Regarding the three interaction terms, SADC   GPD per capita, 
SADC    openness, and SADC    phone density are all statistically significant.  For 
SADC, phone density is not important for attracting FDI.  Neither is the income level, 
which makes sense since—for the relatively small SADC countries, market size (which 
income level partially measure) is not important because FDI probably tends to be 
export-oriented, a tendency confirmed by  our earlier firm-level analysis.  Finally, 
openness is much more important, with a coefficient that is twice that of the rest of the 
world.  Again, our interpretation is that for small countries, openness increases the 
expected value of FDI as openness facilitates exports.  In other words, there is a stronger 
complementarity of openness and FDI for SADC. 
 
What Explains the SADC Disadvantage in FDI?    19
To shed light on how the key variables explain the relatively low FDI per capita in SADC, 
we choose two comparison groups: the East-Asia Pacific countries (EAP, consisting of 
China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand), and the similar-income sample (consisting of 
all countries in our sample that have the same range of income per capita as the SADC).  
While our choice of the similar-income sample is easy to understand, we pick EAP in 
order to see what explains the gap between SADC and the front-runners among the 
developing countries.  The results are contained in Table 9. 
  The first comparison concerns SADC versus EAP. The difference in the 
dependent variable is 1.08 in favor of EAP. The percent of this difference explained by 
variable  k X  is calculated as  Y EX EX SADC k EAP k k   / ) ( * 100 , ,  , where  Y EX R k k  , , ,  are 
the estimated coefficients, the mean  k X  for region R, and the difference in the outcome, 
respectively.  The higher adult share of population in EAP explains 43 percent of the 
observed difference. The higher previous growth rate explains a further 32 percent.   
EAP’s advantage in phone density explains another 24 percent.  The income level 
advantage of EAP adds 16 percent, and a better schooling becomes the last (somewhat) 
important factor, explaining about 9 percent.  Country sizes actually help SADC 
countries since they tend to be smaller, which appears positively correlated with FDI per 
capita. 
  The second comparison is between SADC and countries with similar income.  
The comparison group has an advantage in the dependent variable of 0.41.  The most 
important variables are phone density (43 percent), the adult share of population (39 
percent), the income level (23 percent), and previous growth rates (7 percent).   
 
4.  Conclusions  
Have FDI inflows played a positive role in SADC economies?  Are SADC 
countries attracting too little FDI? What can be done to attract more FDI to this region?  
The answer to the first question is yes.  We found strong evidence that FDI helped South 
African economies.  Foreign firms tend to be larger, export more, have higher   20
productivity and sales growth rates, and thus the presence of these firms tend to raise the 
average firm performance and create jobs for host countries. Moreover, domestic firms in 
the same industry tend to benefit from a stronger presence of foreign firms. In trying to 
answer the second question, we find that FDI flows to countries with a good government 
track record, as indicated by stable high growth in the past and good economic 
fundamentals (i.e., phone density, the adult share of population, and income level).  Usual 
suspects – corruption or the rule of law – do not significantly affect FDI.  Most 
importantly, we do not find exceptionalism in SADC's ability to attract foreign direct 
investment: the SADC dummy is never statistically different from zero. There may be 
some differences between SADC and the rest of the world in FDI behavior: the income 
level appears less important, and openness might be particularly important. Our 
comparisons with other regions suggest that SADC has lower FDI per capita due to 
poorer economic fundamental (previous growth rates, lower income level, phone density, 
and the adult share of the population). The accounting exercise raises another question: 
Why do SADC countries have worse economic fundamentals?  This is beyond the scope 
of this paper.  But there are plenty of analyses shedding light on this question. Some of 
the potential culprits include ethnic polarization (Easterly and Levine, 1997), political 
instability and civil wars (Collier and Gunning 1999), among others.  The key for 
attracting FDI in SADC would be to build a fundamentally sound economy that naturally 
lures FDI.  In addition, our results indicate that openness is especially important for 
SADC. Policies and procedures to encourage openness would therefore be especially 
important for the region.  
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                           Table 1. Definitions of variables in firm-level analysis 
Variable Definitions 
FRN  Share of foreign ownership 
largest owner  Ownership shares by the largest shareholder. 
ln(firm age)  The logarithm of firm age. 
Loss_crime  The share of losses in sales due to crime. 
Ln(GDPpc)  Ln(GDP per capita of the country) 
Firing_cost  Firing costs in terms of weeks of wages, from WDI. 
Interest_spread  Interest spread, from WDI. 
Govt_efficiency  Government effectiveness index, from ICRG. 






     Table 2.   Summary statistics at firm level for the SADC region as a whole 
 
  Foreign firms  Domestic firms 
  mean p50  sd  mean p50  sd 
Ln(L)  3.395 3.091 1.619 2.530 2.398 1.333 
Ln(GDPpc)  7.013 7.230 1.201 6.852 6.951 1.181 
Firing_cost   61.230 53.200 41.204 53.537 32.000 41.339 
Interest_spead   10.583 7.587  10.571 12.157 8.720  12.880 
Govt_efficiency  -0.176 -0.306 0.746  -0.273 -0.334 0.754 
Sales growth  0.405 0.078 1.370 0.285 0.093 1.008 
TFP  0.079 0.008 0.630 -0.057  -0.098  0.522 
TFPtran  0.091 0.023 0.581 0.001 -0.030  0.492 
Exporter  0.207 0.000 0.406 0.077 0.000 0.267 
FRN  0.834 1.000 0.264 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Largest owner   0.711 0.700 0.245 0.839 1.000 0.241 
Ln(firm age)  2.139 2.079 0.984 2.036 1.946 0.968 
Loss_crime   0.012 0.000 0.038 0.021 0.000 0.514 
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                       Table 3. Effects of foreign ownership: SADC sample  
sales growth  TFP  TFPtran 
foreign ownership  0.200** 0.184***  0.141*** 
(0.081) (0.050)  (0.048) 
largest owner  0.174** -0.022  0.029 
(0.075) (0.035)  (0.026) 
ln(firm age)  -0.168*** 0.000  -0.018 
(0.049) (0.012)  (0.012) 
loss_crime  0.039*** -0.015***  -0.022*** 
(0.003) (0.002)  (0.001) 
ln(GDPpc)  -0.218*** 0.065  0.075** 
(0.053) (0.041)  (0.036) 
firing_costs  -0.001* -0.002***  -0.002*** 
(0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) 
interest spread  -0.015*** -0.004** -0.004*** 
(0.003) (0.002)  (0.001) 
government effectiveness  0.170*  -0.081  -0.123* 
(0.101) (0.067)  (0.065) 
ln(sales)  0.041 
(0.025) 
industry dummies  yes  no  no 
Number of observations  3,842  2,938  2,929 
Adjusted R2  0.094  0.083  0.066 
standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level. 
*, ** and ***: statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. 
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                   Table 4. Exporting and Foreign ownership: 
                                  The SADC sample 
exporter 
foreign  0.055*** 
(0.021) 
largest owner  -0.061*** 
(0.024) 
ln(firm age)  0.012 
(0.009) 
loss_power  0.000 
(0.001) 
ln(GDPpc)  0.000 
(0.016) 
fire_cost  -0.000 
(0.000) 
interest_spread  -0.001 
(0.001) 
government effectiveness  -0.008 
(0.021) 
industry dummies  yes 
lnS  0.037*** 
(0.004) 
Number of observations  6,248 
Adjusted R2  0.189 
standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level. 
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     Table 5. Effects of foreign ownership on productivity of SADC domestic firms  
 
TFP TFPtran TFP TFPtran 
largest owner  0.016 0.070** 0.012 0.066** 
(0.039) (0.028) (0.038) (0.026) 
ln(firm age)  -0.003  -0.021  -0.004  -0.023 
(0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) 
loss_crime  -0.014*** -0.021*** -0.015*** -0.022*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
ln(GDPpc)  0.091*** 0.094*** 0.079**  0.081*** 
(0.029) (0.026) (0.031) (0.029) 
firing_costs  -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
interest spread  -0.003** -0.003*** -0.003**  -0.003** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
government effectiveness  -0.108* -0.147*** -0.092  -0.129* 
(0.059) (0.057) (0.067) (0.067) 
Industry-level employment-weighted   0.213** 0.232*** 
                 average foreign ownership  (0.096) (0.082) 
Number of observations  2,215  2,210  2,215  2,210 
Adjusted R2  0.076  0.066  0.074  0.062 
Note.   Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level. 
***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels. 
The sample consists of domestic firms in SADC countries.. 
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Table 6.  Summary Statistics for SADC and Comparator countries:  
2001-2006 average. 
 SADC Non-SADC Non-SADC: 
similar income countries
 Mean Mean Mean
Real growth rate of GDP per capita  2.261 3.128 3.102
GDP per capital, USD real  1,289.358 7,248.203 1,229.144
FDI per capita  36.599 202.808 63.167
FDI/GDP  0.037 0.068 0.041
Rulelaw  0.991 1.181 0.946
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Table 7. Is the SADC region different?  
The dependent variable is ln(FDI per capita + constant) 
The Pooled Sapmle  The similar-income sample 
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se  coef/se 
ln(schoolingt-1) 0.198  0.200  0.138  0.218  0.065 
(0.170) (0.166) (0.177) (0.169)  (0.175) 
ln(phone densityt-1) 0.243**  0.231**  0.261**  0.159  0.121 
(0.116) (0.111) (0.114) (0.110)  (0.106) 
the adult share of populationt-1 4.391**  4.456**  2.505  4.914**  3.621* 
(2.103) (2.086) (2.097) (2.080)  (2.000) 
urban sharet-1  0.334 0.348 0.145 0.378  0.456 
(0.614) (0.610) (0.616) (0.653)  (0.642) 
Ln(population) -0.123*  -0.124**  -0.009  -0.177***  -0.047 
(0.063) (0.063) (0.068) (0.061)  (0.064) 
Relative exchange ratet-1  -0.002* -0.002  -0.002**  0.003  0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008)  (0.009) 
Ln(GDPpct-1) 0.275*  0.268*  0.326**  0.300*  0.376** 
(0.148) (0.149) (0.151) (0.159)  (0.156) 
Mean GDPpc growth  0.075***  0.074***  0.072***  0.069***  0.068*** 
        in the previous 5 yrs  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.014) 
S.D. GDPpc growth  -0.890  -0.860 -1.304*  -0.693  -1.071 
        in the previous 5 yrs  (0.714)  (0.706)  (0.738)  (0.680)  (0.715) 
Rulelawt-1  0.025 0.036  0.018  0.014 
(0.056) (0.055)  (0.057)  (0.058) 
Control of Corruptiont-1 0.064 
(0.070) 
Trade/GDPt-1  0.702*** 0.960*** 
(0.160) (0.195) 
SADC dummy  0.018  -0.011  -0.117  0.049  -0.085 
(0.305) (0.306) (0.286) (0.287)  (0.255) 
Number of observations  3,265  3,265  3,187  2,311  2,269 
Adjusted R2  0.442  0.443  0.455  0.376  0.409 
 Note.  ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels. 
Standard errors clustered at the country level.   
The constant in the dependent variable is 1.4. 
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Table 8.  Is SADC Different?  Another Look   
The dependent variable is ln(FDI per capita + constant) 
 
ln(schoolingt-1)  0.109 
(0.631) 
ln(phone densityt-1)  0.308*** 
(2.711) 
the adult share of populationt-1   2.560 
      (1.263) 
urban sharet-1  0.091 
(0.148) 
Ln(population)  -0.015 
(-0.228) 
Relative exchange ratet-1  -0.002* 
      (-1.743) 
Ln(GDPpct-1)  0.329** 
(2.149) 
Mean GDPpc growth in the previous 5 yrs  0.077*** 
    (5.839) 
S.D. GDPpc growth in the previous 5 yrs  -1.388* 
(-1.862) 
Rulelawt-1  0.018 
(0.341) 
Trade/GDPt-1  0.639*** 
(3.924) 
SADC  1.928 
(1.347) 
SADC * ln(phone densityt-1)  -0.293* 
(-1.791) 
SADC * Ln(GDPpct-1)  -0.386* 
(-1.696) 
SADC * Trade/GDPt-1  0.683* 
(1.939) 
Number of observations  3,187 
Adjusted R2  0.464 
Note:  ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels. 
Standard errors clustered at the country level.   
The constant in the dependent variable is 1.4.   31
                 Table 9.  Accounting for the log FDI per capita outcome  
 








EX EX SADC EAP k  ) ( 
 
Share of adult populationt-1 4.37  0.53  0.64 42.58 
Mean real GDPpc growth rate in  the    
         previous five years  0.08  0.59  5.17  31.81 
ln(phone densityt-1) 0.24  0.42  1.50  24.23 
ln(GDPpct-1)  0.27 6.41  7.05  16.35 
ln(schooling) 0.20  1.10  1.60  9.33 
urbant-1 0.33  0.31  0.37  2.08 
S.D. of real GDPpc growth rate in the  
        previous five years  -0.89  0.07  0.06  1.32 
rulelawt-1 0.03  2.62  3.14  1.22 
Relative exchange ratet-1 0.00  2.71  0.69  0.32 





 mean 2.50  ∆  = 0.41 
ln(phone densityt-1) 0.24  0.42  1.15  43.04 
Share of adult populationt-1 4.37  0.53  0.57 38.51 
ln(GDPpct-1)  0.27 6.41  6.75  22.66 
urbant-1 0.33  0.31  0.43  9.64 
Mean real GDPpc growth rate in  the  
         previous five years  0.08  0.59  0.98  7.09 
ln(population) -0.12  1.91  1.66  7.58 
ln(schooling) 0.20  1.10  1.18  3.86 
Relative exchange ratet-1 0.00  2.71  0.69  0.84 
S.D. of real GDPpc growth rate in the     
          previous five years  -0.89  0.07  0.08  -2.53 
rulelawt-1 0.03  2.62  2.46  -1.01 
Note.    The results for other variables are not reported. 
  The coefficients are based on the same specification in Column (1) of Table 7--except that we do 
not control for SADC dummy here, since it is not statistically significant. 
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The Appendix   
 
Table A.1.  Mean Characteristics for SADC, EAP and the similar-income sample 
 
mean mean mean 
SADC  EAP  Similar income as SADC 
Foreign  0.175 0.135 0.108 
Largest owner   0.813  0.678  0.753 
ln(firm  age)  2.058 2.354 2.324 
Loss_crime  0.020 0.004 0.012 
ln(GDPpc)  6.886 7.247 6.937 
Fire_cost    55.152 88.344 64.715 
interest_spread   11.822  3.542  9.335 
govt_efficiency -0.253  0.052  -0.275 
ln(sales)  4.856 8.288 6.361 
Note. “Similar income as SADC” means income less than 4600 USD (in 2000 value) 
 
             
 